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Abstract 
This paper aims to identify the extent to which the non-promise of membership of the 
European Union (EU) precludes the motivation of Ukraine as European Neighbour-
hood Policy country to adopt EU policies in the field of market access, namely 
technical standards and regulations. Its approximation approach is compared to the 
fast-tracked accession of Slovakia, which was driven by a clear-cut membership 
promise. Furthermore, the paper elaborates whether the conclusion of an 
Association Agreement between the EU  and Ukraine, including a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, provides sufficient incentives for Ukraine to 
continue reforming its quality infrastructure in order to gain access to the Single 
European Market. Finally, scenarios of possible developments of EU-Ukraine relations 
are deliberated in the context of the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle. The paper argues 
that market access provides sufficient stimulus for third countries to adhere to EU 
technical standards – even in the absence of a clear and credible promise of future 
EU membership. Yet, in the case of Ukraine, the country’s relations with Russia appear 
to compete with its EU approximation process, resulting for the time being in Ukraine 
attempting to pursue a balanced dual cooperation with both the EU and Russia. 
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Introduction: does a membership perspective make a difference? 
The past years witnessed slow progress in the adoption and implementation of 
a new Association Agreement between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine. This 
Association Agreement also encompasses a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTA). In the light of these developments, the following question arises: 
to what extent is Ukraine motivated to adopt the EU’s rules warranting access to the 
Single European Market (SEM), in particular those applicable to quality infrastructure, 
given that the EU has never made an explicit and credible commitment to recognise 
the Ukrainian membership ambitions?  
The paper is structured into three consecutive parts: first, Damro’s concept of 
Market Power Europe (MPE) is employed to provide a theoretical point of departure 
for analysis of developments in the area of technical harmonisation.1 Second, the 
author  briefly  introduces the Slovak accession process and the milestones in 
negotiations on the chapter of free movement of goods. The Slovak path of 
adoption of the EU acquis is compared to the process which is currently underway in 
Ukraine. Furthermore, the  current politico-economic situation in Ukraine and the 
nature of its cooperation with the EU under the framework of the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy (ENP) are scrutinised. Third, the Ukrainian approximation process is 
analysed. Fourth, the paper outlines lessons learned and possible future scenarios of 
EU-Ukraine cooperation and their consequences for Ukrainian integration aspirations. 
The paper argues that market access provides sufficient stimulus for third 
countries to adhere to EU technical standards – even in the absence of a clear and 
credible promise of future EU membership. Hence, the Association Agreement 
complemented by a DCFTA provides incentives for Ukraine to continue harmonising 
its technical standards with the EU. 
 
Market Power Europe 
Since the inception of the ‘European project’ in the 1950s, the European 
Communities and subsequently the EU have come a long way. The EU has, inter alia, 
gradually expanded its policy focus from a purely regional to a more global reach. 
After the historical accession of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 
in 2004, the EU needed to face internal discussions on how to deal with the new 
                                                 
1 C. Damro, “Market Power Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 19, no. 5, 2012, 
pp. 682-699. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2013 
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neighbours’ accession demands. A single umbrella was necessary  to cover this 
cooperation. As a result, the ENP framework has emerged.2 
As the EU  has gradually established its identity and amplified its position in 
international relations, the theoretical debate has  attempted  to capture this 
evolution. Orbie’s Civilian Power Europe  (CPE)3  and Manner’s Normative Power 
Europe (NPE)4  concepts are claimed to provide less comprehension of external 
actors’ motivation in pursuit of SEM access than Damro’s Market Power Europe 
(MPE).5 Thus, due to the limited extent of this paper, the latter is more thoroughly 
scrutinised here. Damro’s concept of MPE departs from the historical perspective of 
the  founding  raison d’être as well as the  evolution to the present state, which 
describes the EU  as predominantly “market integration”.6  While disregarding 
traditional conceptualisations of power in terms of security policy, Damro claims that 
the  EU  has been highly effective in exerting its influence in other external  policy 
domains, and the SEM in particular. The latter is viewed as an ecosystem where a 
clash of interests determines the EU’s success in the international arena and thus 
provides a basis for a conceptualisation of the EU as MPE.7  
Damro has incorporated various theories and empirical evidence into the MPE 
concept to warrant the claim that the EU is indeed a market power in international 
relations.8 The role of the common market and the common commercial policy is 
correctly reiterated as crucial in laying  the  foundations of the  EU’s identity and 
integration project.9 At the same time, the EU has gradually evolved from a purely 
economic regional organisation into a  global market power with  an impact in a 
wide array of policy domains.10  
Going into more detail, Damro identifies “three interrelated and mutually-
reinforcing characteristics: material existence, institutional features and interest 
contestation”.11 First, the material existence corresponds to the SEM, which lies at the 
                                                 
2 J. Solana & C. Patten, Letter on ‘Wider Europe’, 7 August 2002. 
3 J. Orbie, Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the European Union, Farnham, Ashgate, 
2008. 
4  I. Manners, “Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, p. 235. 
5 Damro, op. cit., pp. 682-699. 
6 Ibid., p. 683. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., pp. 683-684. 
9 Ibid., p. 685. 
10 Ibid., p. 685. 
11 Ibid., p. 686. Martin Minarik 
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core of MPE. Importantly, the EU’s power extends beyond its economic influence to 
impacting other actors’ behaviour via an externalisation of the EU’s internal policies. 
For the purpose of the further argumentation, it is indispensable to acknowledge 
Drezner’s recognition of material incentives and actors’ perceptions as factors that 
determine the role of market size in the externalisation of internal rules.12 
Second,  the EU  has gradually developed a  one-of-its-kind institutional 
architecture that has facilitated the externalisation of its economic and social 
regulatory scheme. Due to the latter’s complexity, a myriad of stakeholder groups 
engages in policy-making processes with the aim to steer decision-making in their 
favour. The need for the EU to counteract these pressures is well captured an 
emphasis on regulatory  expertise, a clear chain of responsibility and an effective 
oversight.13 
Third, interest contestation refers to the need to account for different 
stakeholder interests in  the  SEM. According to Young, these interests pertain to 
economic regulation, which institutionalises the rules of the game on the SEM, and 
social regulation, which covers the outcomes of this game.14 In turn, the regulatory 
environment induced by these rules affects the SEM both internally and externally.  
As a result, the EU exerts various types of power in its external relations in order 
to steer other actors’ interests and behaviour. This paper focuses on the incentives 
driving the harmonisation of technical regulation in the cases of Slovakia’s accession 
to the EU and Ukraine’s approximation to EU rules. First, harmonisation of technical 
standards and regulations is an indispensable prerequisite for a proper and efficient 
functioning of the SEM.15  Second, Slovakia and Ukraine have been chosen to 
illustrate the dependency of the harmonisation engagement on an eventual 
promise of future membership  based on the  following  reasons:  first, due to the 
historical, geographical and cultural affinity of Slovakia and Ukraine; and second, 
due to the fact that Slovakia after its much contested era in the second half of the 
1990s might have been left out of the future enlargement process altogether had it 
                                                 
12  D. Drezner, All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes,  Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2007, pp. 32-33. 
13 Damro, op.cit., p. 688. 
14 A.R. Young, “The Politics of Regulation and the Internal Market”, in K.E. Jørgensen, M.A. 
Pollack & B. Rosamond (eds.), Handbook of European Union Politics, London, Sage, 2006, p. 
377. 
15  European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee – The Operation of Directive 
98/34/EC in 2009 and 2010, COM(2011) 853 final, Brussels, 7 December 2011, p. 3. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2013 
7 
not implemented political changes and much needed economic, financial  and 
other reforms. Thus, the Slovak case serves  well as an example for Ukraine in its 
accession endeavours, in particular considering that the EU had for long not 
developed a regional policy towards its Eastern neighbours and preferred bilateral 
relations instead.16 Moreover, Slovakia as one of the fastest countries to adopt EU 
rules in the accession process illustrates well the effects of such an unambiguous 
promise on the national policy-making. Ukraine, on the other hand, serves to analyse 
the extent to which the non-promise of future membership precludes and/or 
incentivises adoption of EU technical standards. 
To summarise, the concept of MPE provides a good starting point for further 
analysis of the subject of this paper: to what extent are non-EU countries motivated 
to adhere to the EU’s SEM regulations? Several of the above-mentioned MPE 
features are instrumental for this deliberation. First, the distinction between material 
incentives and actors’ perceptions will be employed to analyse the prerequisites for 
a successful realisation of the EU’s market power and the approximation of market-
based rules such as technical standards. Second, this paper argues that the size of 
the SEM provides a substantial incentive for Ukraine to adopt the related rules. Third, 
given that the EU possesses sufficient regulatory expertise, coherence and 
sanctioning authority, it is able to exert its power towards third actors.  
The paper now turns to an empirical scrutiny of the Slovak and Ukrainian 
approaches to the approximation of technical standards. 
 
Slovakia’s accession process 
The underlying question of this paper, Slovakia’s and Ukraine’s motivations to 
approximate the EU acquis, is also pertinent to a broader discourse on incentives 
inherent to the EU enlargement and ENP-related policies. Prior to the Slovak 
accession in 2004, the long-awaited and eventually spelled-out promise of future 
membership was a crucial driving force behind the ambitiously-speedy  Slovak 
adoption of EU acquis. More concretely, the forthcoming section focuses on the first 
chapter of negotiations – the free movement of goods, which handles standardi-
sation, technical regulation, conformity assessment and mutual recognition of 
industrial products in the SEM, commonly termed as quality infrastructure. 
                                                 
16 A. Duleba, "Why the EU Needs Only One Eastern Policy: Deficits of the Existing Framework", 
International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, vol. 16, no. 1, 2007, p. 24. Martin Minarik 
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The Slovak road to the EU started in 1993 after  the dissolution of Czecho-
slovakia. The fast signature, ratification and entry into force of the so-called ‘Europe 
Agreement’ with the EU effectively enabled Slovakia and the EU to intensify their 
cooperation.17  In addition to establishing a mutual contractual relationship, the 
Agreement recognised the membership aspirations of the CEECs, expressed the EU’s 
intention to help them in their transition and, last but not least, established the legal 
framework to guide the accession process.18 
The membership aspirations of the CEECs were recognised by the Conclusions 
of the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993: the member states agreed that 
the countries “that so desire shall become members of the European Union”.19 These 
Conclusions also established a set of rules that these countries were expected to fulfil 
in order to become EU members. 
In Schimmelfennig’s words, such a commitment effectively meant a 
‘rhetorical entrapment’ of the EU.20 The accession of the CEECs was viewed as a 
matter of time, subject only to  the fulfilment of criteria outlined in the Presidency 
Conclusions, not a matter of any other political decision. Therefore, although 
Slovakia submitted its membership application in June 1995, it can be argued that 
the link between the 1993 ‘Europe Agreement’ and the Conclusions of the 
Presidency of the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 paved the so-called “from 
Copenhagen to Copenhagen” irreversible way for future membership of the Slovak 
Republic.21 
Despite the promising approach on the EU side, the Slovak progression 
towards the EU was halted by unfavourable circumstances on the domestic political 
scene. The submission of the Slovak application for EU membership took place during 
                                                 
17 “Slovensko a EÚ – vzťahy do členstva (Slovakia and the EU – relations until the member-
ship)”, Európska únia, 2006. 
18 D. Phinnemore, Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, “Future Enlargement”, lecture, 
College of Europe, Bruges, 17 January 2012. 
19 European Council, “Conclusions of the Presidency”, 21-22 June 1993, op.cit., p. 12. 
20 F. Schimmelfennig, “The Process of Enlargement: Problems, Interests, and Norms”, in Jeremy 
Richardson (ed.), European Union: Power and Policy-Making, London, Routledge, 2006, 3rd 
edn., pp. 217-218. 
21 J. Figel & M. Adamiš, Slovensko na ceste do Európskej únie,  Kapitoly a skúsenosti (Slovakia 
on the road to the European Union, chapters and experience), Bratislava, Slovenská 
spoločnosť  pre  zahraničnú  politiku  –  Centrum pre európsku politiku (Slovak Foreign Policy 
Association – Centre for the European policy), 2003, p. 8.  EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2013 
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the much-contested  era  of  Vladimír  Mečiar  in  June  1995.22  Despite  the  Mečiar 
government’s proclamation of pro-EU aspirations as well as an awareness of high 
non-compliance costs, little was done to substantiate this rhetorical commitment. In 
other words, the then-government engaged in what Schimmelfennig refers to as 
‘dualistic policy’, that is, divergence of commitments to the EU principles on the 
domestic level as opposed to the external level.23 Nonetheless, it can be argued that 
EU conditionality must have been effective at least to a certain extent, as it had a 
decisive effect on the outcome of the 1998 parliamentary elections. The definitive 
loss  of  Mečiar’s  political  rule  radically  shifted  the  dynamics  of  EU-Slovak relations 
towards a more favourable development.24  
In spite of positive reactions of both the Slovak citizens and the European 
Commission, this historical overturn in the Slovak political situation did not provide 
satisfactory grounds for the EU to open accession negotiations already in late 1998. 
Such a decision came only a year later when the Helsinki European Council decided 
to open the accession negotiations with six candidate countries, including Slovakia. 
Following this credible and legitimate commitment of the EU to its enlargement 
prospects, the Slovak process of acquis adoption could officially begin. 
Since the adoption of the ‘Europe Agreement’ and its Protocol on Conformity 
Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products in 1993, it governed the adoption 
of EU standards for industrial products in the pre-accession period along with the 
Accession Partnership. The follow-up screening process revealed many hindrances 
that needed to be corrected to ensure Slovakia’s preparedness to cope with 
competition in the SEM. Even though the 1997 Commission ‘Avis’  and the 1998 
Progress Report reiterated significant advancement of the structural reforms, Slovakia 
was far from reaching the EU market standards. The greatest room for improvement 
was identified, inter alia, in the area of approximation of standardisation and 
certification.25 “Separation of the legislative, standardisation and accreditation tasks 
and establishment of market surveillance mechanisms” were seen as key 
prerequisites for the adoption of the EU’s ‘New Approach’ and ‘Global Approach'.26 
                                                 
22  F. Schimmelfennig, S. Engert & H. Knobel, “Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The 
Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 41, no. 3, 2003, p. 502. 
23 Ibid., p. 505. 
24 Ibid., p. 506. 
25 Commission of the European Communities, Composite Paper – Reports on progress towards 
accession by each of the candidate countries, Brussels, 1998, pp. 8-9. 
26 Ibid., pp. 13, 15. Martin Minarik 
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This unsatisfactory evaluation motivated Slovakia to speed up the reforms. Thus, EU 
conditionality proved highly effective in terms of material incentives and actors’ 
perceptions.  
The 1999 Progress Report welcomed the new momentum by stating that 
“problems of reliance on [former Soviet-type] mandatory certification and 
inadequate preparation of the private sector to undertake voluntary certification”27 
had been addressed, and  the  adoption of the EU harmonised standards (EN)28 
began  in some areas.29  While the positive  assessment  in  this report served as 
additional catalyst for reform efforts more emphasis was at the same time to be put 
not only on legislative approximation but also on the implementation and institutional 
strengthening.30 
In 2001, further progress was recognised in the field of legislative approxima-
tion, the transposition of European standards and the membership obligations in the 
respective EU organisations (ESO).31  The positive developments were further 
acknowledged by the 2002 Progress Report: it welcomed in particular the Slovak 
extension of acquis  approximation in the field of technical  product requirements, 
conformity assessment and market surveillance.32  By 2002 most of the ‘New 
Approach’ Directives were transposed into the Slovak quality infrastructure system, 
which was thus well-aligned with EU requirements. 33 
Finally, it is noteworthy to consider the Slovak developments in the context of 
Damro’s principles for the  successful functioning of MPE vis-à-vis EU’s external 
partners, in this case candidate countries.34  First, the EU clearly possessed and 
influentially exerted its regulatory expertise to facilitate the alignment of Slovakia’s 
regulatory framework with the then-existent EU acquis. Second, owing to horizontal, 
vertical as well as sectoral coherence at the EU level, Slovakia was effectively bound 
                                                 
27 Ibid., p. 15. 
28 EN standard is a publication that provides rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or 
their results, for common and repeated use. “European Standards (EN)”, European 
Committee for Standardisation, 2012. 
29  Commission of the European Communities, Regular Report from the Commission on 
Slovakia’s progress towards accession, Brussels, 13 October 1999, p. 32. 
30  Commission of the European Communities, Enlargement Strategy Paper -  Report on 
progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries, Brussels, 2000, p. 57. 
31  Commission of the European Communities, 2001 Regular Report on Slovakia’s Progress 
towards accession, SEC(2001) 1754, Brussels, 13 November 2001, p. 39. 
32 Ibid. 
33  Commission of the European Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Slovakia’s Progress 
towards accession, SEC(2002) 1410, Brussels, 9 October 2002, p. 49. 
34 Damro, op.cit. pp. 688. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2013 
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to  the  EU’s regulatory framework in the field of quality infrastructure. The third 
principle pertains to the impact of the EU’s sanctioning authority. On the one hand, it 
can be argued that it did not apply substantively in this case as Slovakia was not yet 
a full member and the EU’s view was that sanctions may hinder the progress. On the 
other hand, the EU maintained a certain sanctioning conditionality through the 
potential threat of postponing accession, even though as Haughton argues, 
conditionality is most valid and efficient before the decision on opening of accession 
negotiations is taken.35  
In order to examine the difference in impact that the EU regulatory expertise, 
coherence and sanctioning authority had on Slovakia compared to Ukraine’s 
approximation of EU rules, this paper now turns to an analysis of Ukraine’s motivation 
to approximate its technical standards to those of the EU in view of the EU’s non-
promise of future membership and the historical alignment with Russia. 
 
Ukraine’s approximation process with the EU 
It has become clear soon after the Soviet Union’s collapse that unlike the 
immediate CEEC neighbours, the EU would adopt a rather reserved strategy towards 
its more distant ex-Soviet neighbours. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
with Ukraine (PCA) constitutes an example of how this cooperation was to differ from 
that preceding Eastern enlargement. As such it was not linked to the promise made 
at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993.36 The Agreement gave grounds to 
closer, more functional and sectoral cooperation, yet without explicit promise of 
future membership. The fundamental reason behind such a divergent approach is 
believed to rest in the endeavour to strike a balance within the EU-Ukraine-Russia 
triangle.37  
The PCA constituted the first step towards closer EU-Ukraine relations. The first 
characteristic was that the foreseen approximation to EU rules was to be conducted 
                                                 
35 T. Haughton, “When Does the EU Make a Difference? Conditionality and the Accession 
Process in Central and Eastern Europe”, Political Studies Review, vol. 5, 2007, p. 244. 
36  The Copenhagen European Council summit affirmed that countries that concluded 
Association Agreements shall become members of the EU, if they so desire. European 
Council, “Conclusions of the Presidency”, 21-22 June 1993, op.cit., p. 12. 
37  K. Wolczuk, “Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on 
Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 61, no. 2, 
March 2009, p. 187. Martin Minarik 
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on a voluntary basis.38  The second difference to the Slovak case was the non-
existence of any provisions on future membership and/or pre-accession condition-
ality in the PCA. Not surprisingly, such an approach did not provide substantial 
motivation for Ukraine to deliver the PCA-envisioned change, such as the enhance-
ment of mutual political dialogue, consolidation of democratic developments or 
economic cooperation, including approximation of quality infrastructure.39 
Even though the PCA was signed in 1994 and ratified in 1998, it can be argued 
that the most salient and fruitful cooperation started only after the launch of the ENP 
in 2004. In the case of Ukraine, the main instrument to facilitate cooperation has 
been the bilateral ‘Action Plan’. It outlines the main areas of cooperation and breaks 
them down to concrete reforms that need to be implemented to warrant access to 
the SEM. 
Since the drivers behind the approximation of EU rules in the cases of Slovakia 
and Ukraine are based on qualitatively different conditions, the EU sought  to 
incentivise its conditionality exerted on Ukraine. The  level  aimed at was to be 
comparable  to incentives offered to CEEC enlargement countries, yet short of a 
commitment to full membership.  This is achieved in a two-fold way. First, the EU 
promotes its fundamental principles and values as inscribed in its founding treaties by 
exerting the ‘polity conditionality’, a term which pertains to “domestic democratic 
principles, human rights and minority protection”,  introduced by Sedelmeier.40 
Second, and more importantly for the field of technical standards and regulations, it 
exerts its MPE to shape the process of approximation of EU rules and thus facilitates a 
more functional cooperation. This has been done under the ENP umbrella. As in the 
CEECs’ case, it can be instrumental in enabling the immediate neighbours to cope 
with reform processes and be better prepared for eventual future membership while 
simultaneously respecting the EU’s absorption capacity.41 
Despite these undoubtedly positive features, the ENP has been under question 
since its very inception with regard to the incentives offered to the participating 
countries. As Wolczuk rightly points out, the ENP does not provide sufficiently strong 
                                                 
38  A. Dimitrova & R. Dragneva, “Constraining external governance: interdependence with 
Russia and the CIS as limits to EU’s rule transfer in Ukraine”, Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol. 16, no. 6, 2009, p. 855. 
39 Ibid., p. 856. 
40 U. Sedelmeier, “Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States”, Living Reviews in 
European Governance, vol. 1, no. 3, 2006, p. 12.  
41 D. Phinnemore, Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, “Future Enlargement”, lecture, 
the College of Europe, Bruges, 4-5 April 2012. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2013 
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and unambiguous incentives to be able to achieve its ambition of influencing the 
domestic reforms.42 The ambiguity of the ENP rewards thus poses a potential risk as to 
the degree of acceptability of the EU’s conditionally-imposed reforms in the neigh-
bouring countries. Unlike the EU’s Eastern enlargement, the ENP logic does not 
appear to be bound by any past enlargement commitments. Thus, only when ENP 
countries aiming at EU membership achieve a desirable level of convergence and 
preparedness under the ENP to assume their potential future rights and obligations 
stemming from membership, the question of enlargement may become more 
prominent.43 
 
SEM motives 
As outlined above, the access to the SEM, either partially or fully, is the ENP’s 
main ‘carrot’ and for the moment also the ultimate goal of non-EU partner countries. 
The approximation of the quality infrastructure rules was incorporated into the ‘EU-
Ukraine Action Plan’ and the ‘EU-Ukraine Association Agenda’. Moreover, already 
article 4 of the PCA mentioned the possibility of negotiating an EU-Ukraine Free Trade 
Area (FTA). This was to follow substantial improvements of the Ukrainian market 
economy as well as accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  
The ‘European choice’ has been proclaimed after the ratification of the PCA, 
which coincided with the presidential term of Leonid Kuchma. Nonetheless, the 
notion of closer ties with the EU was effectively centralised around and not extending 
beyond Kuchma’s office.44 As argued by Wolczuk, the lack of ‘European’ ownership 
among the Ukrainian political elites led to institutional, administrative and legal 
shortcomings, which ultimately delayed implementation of the reforms foreseen by 
the PCA.45 This view is further supported by Protsyk, who elaborates that the lack of 
ownership and engagement on the Ukrainian political level was also constituted by 
inherent historical weaknesses in political partisanship programming.46 Last but not 
least, weak and ineffective coordination is also assigned to the fact that no 
functional compliance enforcement mechanism was enshrined in the PCA. 
                                                 
42 Wolczuk, “Implementation without Coordination”, op.cit., p. 190. 
43 Phinnemore, op.cit. 
44 Wolczuk, “Implementation without Coordination”, op.cit., p. 193. 
45 Ibid. 
46 O. Protsyk, “Domestic Political Institutions and Their Responses to EU Enlargement in Ukraine 
and Russia”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 36, no. 4, 2003, p. 438. Martin Minarik 
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EU-Ukrainian cooperation became stronger with the ‘Action Plan’, which was 
adopted in the wake of the ‘Orange Revolution’ and the launch of the ENP. First, the 
elites of the ‘Orange Revolution’ committed themselves to adopt so-called ‘road 
maps’ to ensure greater alignment with the EU acquis in general and with quality 
infrastructure  in particular.47  Second, the ENP-proposed ‘Action Plan’  effectively 
replaced previously ambiguous proclamations on  the  future adoption of EU rules. 
Both events were conducive to more approximation on the Ukrainian side.  
One of the strongest driving forces behind the approximation of Ukrainian 
technical standards to those applied by the EU and the international community was 
Ukraine’s accession to the WTO in 2008.  
 
WTO accession 
Three fundamental reasons can be identified  as to why and how WTO 
membership is relevant to Ukraine’s negotiations with the EU. First, the historical 
Soviet-type  ‘state standards’  (GOST)  legacy was a key reason behind the limited 
compatibility of Ukraine’s quality infrastructure with that of the EU.48 The underlying 
differences were caused mainly by the following factors: on the one hand, GOST 
standards were and remain mandatory for producers of all  products, not only of 
industrial products as opposed to the voluntary status of EN standards; and on the 
other hand,  by  the fact that the quality infrastructure was centralised under one 
single authority –  the State Committee of Ukraine on Technical Regulation and 
Consumer Policy (DSSU) –  as opposed to a  decentralised hierarchy of authorities 
responsible for individual areas of quality infrastructure under EU rules.49 Owing to the 
substantial differences in the scope of activities covered by the Ukrainian and the EU 
systems of quality infrastructure, a  significant harmonisation was necessary for the 
sake of their greater compatibility. 
Second, the binding nature of the WTO membership obligations is probably 
most important for the deliberation of changes to Ukraine’s quality infrastructure. The 
accession requirements gave ground for subsequent negotiations of a FTA and an 
Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products 
                                                 
47 Wolczuk, “Implementation without Coordination”, op.cit., pp. 200-201. 
48 N. Frota et al., “Assessment of the Ukrainian quality infrastructure: challenges imposed by 
the WTO and commitments to EU accession”, Key engineering materials, vol. 437, May 2010, 
p. 17. 
49 J. Langbein, “Organizing Regulatory Convergence outside the EU – Setting Policy-Specific 
Conditionality and Building Domestic Capacities”, KFG Working Paper Series, no. 33, 
December 2011, p. 8. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2013 
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(ACAA)  and  later also for the  approximation of EN standards, which are closely 
linked to the free movement of goods. 
Third, product placement and consumer safety on the SEM is governed by the 
EN standards which were developed by three EU-recognised European 
Standardisation Organisations (ESOs).  These coexist along the globally-recognised 
standards developed by the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO). Based 
on an agreement between the ESOs and the ISO, some 30% of EN standards are 
identical to ISO standards, thereby dually applicable on the SEM as well as the 
global market.50 Thus, the Ukrainian WTO membership constituted an important step 
towards gaining a greater stake in the SEM as well as for speeding up the 
approximation process with the EU. 
Although the WTO accession envisaged better alignment of Ukrainian quality 
infrastructure with the global and European one, several contentious areas still await 
their full harmonisation. In 2010, Ukraine embarked upon a further decentralisation of 
its institutional framework for quality infrastructure. However, these legal acts have 
not produced the desired effects –  either because they have not been fully 
implemented or because they require further action for proper implementation.51  
Despite some progress in the approximation to the EU quality infrastructure, 
the struggle for the implementation of necessary measures is continuously disrupted 
by powerful lobbying of large producers in the DSSU and a marginalised capacity of 
the Ukrainian Parliament.52 Currently, the DSSU remains the primary authority in the 
field of technical standardisation (setting standards) as well as conformity assessment 
(enforcement of standards).53 Therefore, further legal and implementation alignment 
with the EU’s quality infrastructure is needed to facilitate greater access to the SEM. 
 
New momentum with the Eastern Partnership 
The 2009 Prague summit provided a new momentum for enhancement of 
relations between the EU and its neighbours, most notably by launching the ‘Eastern 
Partnership’ (EaP). The envisioned enhancement of this Eastern dimension of the ENP 
is viewed as a historical commitment of the EU to achieve a more credible and 
substantial cooperation with its Eastern neighbours. In 2008 the negotiations on the 
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new Association Agreement, inclusive of a DCFTA, began in a follow-up to Ukraine’s 
accession to the WTO. Hence, the new agreements constitute a substantial 
qualitative step forward in re-building the relationship between the EU and Ukraine 
under the EaP.  
As Wijkman emphasises, the Association Agreement  and DCFTA do not 
constitute a take-it-or-leave-it kind of agreement.54 As the EaP countries differ, so do 
the Association Agreements with DCFTAs. Therefore, several specific characteristics 
of these negotiations need to be taken into consideration when assessing the 
process of the agreements’ conclusion and implementation.  First, one needs to 
consider the extensive scope of the to-be-transposed acquis. In the long run, the 
agreements aim at a rapid liberalisation of all trade in goods. The ambiguity of the 
term  ‘long  run’  leaves sufficient negotiation leeway both for  the  EU and the 
respective country. Second, the flexibility of the acquis needs to be considered. It is 
obvious that it will not be transposed unaltered. However, it has to be implemented 
in such a fashion that it will not give rise to potential trade diversion. Third, for the sake 
of a favourable cost-benefit ratio, the sequencing of the transposition shall follow a 
certain logic in order not to discourage it. Although the approximation of technical 
standards and regulations may prove costly at the beginning, the expected benefits 
exceed substantially the initial costs. Fourth, transition periods and asymmetrical 
concessions constitute another crucial element of the agreements. While the EN 
standards need to be implemented to ensure SEM access, they do not need to be 
used on the Ukrainian domestic market.  
Even under the  recent contentious political developments in Ukraine, EU 
officials from DG TRADE reiterate that Ukraine is committed to adopting and 
implementing the legislation, which is necessary to fulfil the criteria discerned in the 
Association Agreement and DCFTA.55  After the latter’s ratification, the conclusion 
and implementation of an ACAA is awaited.56 However, several ambiguities on the 
domestic Ukrainian scene could further impede Ukraine’s approximation to EU 
technical standards as well as overall EU-Ukrainian cooperation. In order to continue 
further developing EU-Ukrainian relations  and Ukraine’s political and economic 
approximation to the EU, the EU called  most recently on Ukraine to remedy any 
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shortcomings connected to the October 2012 parliamentary elections (Tymoshenko 
case), to tackle the issues of selective justice, and to implement reforms defined in 
the jointly agreed Association Agenda.57  If Ukraine fails to achieve substantial 
progress before the next EaP summit in November 2013, the EU is prepared to further 
postpone the signing of the Association Agreement inclusive of DCFTA.58 
 
Bringing together the external environment and domestic motivations 
EU conditionality is deemed to deliver good  results when there is a  clear 
domestic political ownership and commitment, termed by Casier as ‘self-imposed 
conditionality’.59 As EU-Ukraine cooperation has evolved, so have the perceptions 
and the engagement of domestic political elites. As deliberated above, in the light 
of insufficient commitment of the Ukrainian political elites to the approximation 
process, it is argued that such neglect can be overcome by allowing for more 
engagement of lower-rank civil servants. The emergence of a ‘white-collar class’ of 
committed experts stirred the approximation process further along the lines of closer 
cooperation with the EU.60  
Political divide on the domestic political scene is another factor to be 
considered when deliberating Ukraine’s current and future engagement with the EU. 
The country and its electorate are perpetually antagonised by pro-Western influence 
in the Western part of Ukraine, while pro-Russian influence prevails in the Eastern part. 
Since the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004, this dichotomy of political elites has continued 
being one of the reasons behind constant frictions in Ukrainian politics. Naturally, it 
also has an indispensable impact on the degree to which rhetorical proclamations 
of interest to approximate the quality infrastructure are actually turned into real 
legislative proposals and later implemented. 
The nature of the EU’s conditionality vis-à-vis Ukraine can be further scrutinised 
by employing Damro’s MPE approach. First, the EU clearly adopted an approach of 
exerting its regulatory expertise in approximation of Ukraine’s quality infrastructure. 
Second, coherence of the EU’s approach towards Ukraine has been present on both 
technical and political levels. And third, Damro’s conceptualisation of MPE is useful in 
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emphasising the role of the EU’s sanctioning authority. Although it has not been 
applicable as such, sufficient sanctions follow from the fact that without adequate 
compliance, the SEM access for Ukrainian products would remain rather limited. 
Irrespective of the powerful nature of the EU’s conditionality, the question of 
Ukrainian motivations to approximate the EU-based rules is and will remain a subject 
of both policy and theoretical scrutiny. In this regard, Wolczuk argues that the lack of 
a membership perspective along with the ill-defined goal of the ENP has limited its 
impact in Ukraine.61  Therefore, the question arises whether the overarching 
motivation of Ukraine is solely bound to future EU membership, even though no such 
promise has been made. Do we see a gradual implementation of pre-accession 
conditionality for the sake of achieving sufficient preparedness for potential 
membership? Or does the EU simply wish to promote more approximation in order to 
foster inter- and intra-regional cooperation? 
It is necessary to understand the EU’s and the Ukrainian motives in a wider 
geopolitical, rather than technical context. Having Russia at the doorstep plays a 
crucial role. Hence, the following section considers the Ukrainian motivations and 
ambiguities in approximation with  the EU technical standards vis-à-vis its most 
important geopolitical partner Russia. 
 
Ukraine and Russia 
An initial objective of the ENP was to also foster the EU’s cooperation with 
Russia by including it in the group of neighbouring countries and in particular 
providing it with a stake in the SEM.62  However, Russia rejected  this  form of 
cooperation. It views itself as a more prominent – strategic – partner of the EU and 
thus opted out of the common ENP framework.63  However, due to historically-
engrained geopolitical interests of Russia in Eastern  Europe,  the analysis of the 
potential impact of the ENP and the EaP on Ukraine’s motivation to reform its quality 
infrastructure cannot neglect the most salient aspects of Ukraine-Russia relations. 
Ukraine is a founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a 
regional organisation that committed former Soviet republics to a new form of 
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cooperation with Russia.64  The interaction of Ukraine and Russia within  the  CIS is 
particularly  determined  by their strategic economic, energy and security 
interdependence.65  
As  argued elsewhere,  the selective sectoral cooperation with the EU and 
Russia may explain why Ukraine positioned itself into a role of a self-imposed ‘buffer 
zone’ between the EU and Russia.66 For instance, the high energy interdependence 
of Ukraine and Russia must be considered separately from the increasing economic 
cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. It can be argued that Ukraine 
intentionally intensifies its functional and sectoral cooperation with both the EU and 
Russia. A targeted pursuit of its interests is possible through the participation in the 
EU’s SEM as well as the Single Economic Space (SES) which was proposed by Russia 
under the umbrella of the CIS.67 The functional cooperation within the EU-Ukraine-
Russia triangle or –  the SEM-Ukraine-SES triangle  – is by definition competitive. It is 
probably inevitable that the gradually increasing rivalry of these economic 
integration areas will ultimately translate into barriers to mutual cooperation.68 In such 
a case, Ukraine’s quality infrastructure in certain sectors may have to diverge from 
the one required by the SEM.  
On the other hand, it could be hypothesised that the WTO membership of 
Ukraine and Russia may constitute a factor that stimulates future convergence of 
their  quality infrastructure systems. However, empirical evidence from some CIS 
member states demonstrates that even the approximation with ISO standards 
required by WTO accession does not provide for permanent approximation.69 When 
deliberating the impact of economic integration projects on national standardisa-
tion models, it is also purposeful to consider the calls for a Eurasian Union in 201170 as 
a continuation of the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
launched in 2010.71 These three current members have already started to establish 
EU-like institutions, aiming to gradually include all CIS countries. For Ukraine this would 
imply the introduction of a common external tariff for third countries, thus rendering 
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the EU-Ukraine FTA effectively dysfunctional.72 Therefore, staying out of this Customs 
Union  and Eurasian Union  can  be  seen  in line with the balanced approach to 
economic approximation that Ukraine strives to strike vis-à-vis the EU and Russia.73 
Given the relatively short existence and  the  high ambitions of this Customs 
Union  and Eurasian  Union,  the  EU should carefully balance out this integration 
project’s attractiveness, as it already constitutes a substantial basis for the EaP 
countries’ approximation with Russia. On the other hand, I have argued that the 
DCFTA and the ACAA constitute a favourable offer to Ukraine and have proven as 
sufficiently incentivising an approximation to the EU quality infrastructure in Ukraine. 
 
Lessons learned and future scenarios 
This paper has attempted  to show that conditionality linked to economic 
approximation in the field of technical standards and regulations provides 
substantive incentives for ENP countries such as Ukraine. This is so despite the fact 
that the EU does not provide the ENP, and the EaP countries in particular, with a 
promise of future enlargement.   
Although Ukraine’s adoption and implementation of an EU-like quality 
infrastructure may depend on future progress, the initialling of the Association 
Agreement shows a promising development in EU-Ukrainian relations. Thus, it can be 
inferred that the EU has succeeded in exerting its influence vis-à-vis Ukraine even 
without a clear, credible and committed promise of membership.74 Langbein and 
Wolczuk concede, however, that Ukraine may face difficulties in terms of the size of 
its industrial base, the power of its interest groups as well as the domestic political 
division, which simultaneously favours both the EU and Russia.75  The domestic 
perceptions and the commitment of the political elites to the approximation and 
reform processes are, “and will remain, at the pinnacle of the convergence 
process”.76 Thus, it has been argued that Ukraine intentionally balances its economic 
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position between the EU and Russia in order to maximise the benefits stemming from 
this dual cooperation. Nonetheless, Ukraine is expected to eventually face a need to 
clearly choose between the EU and Russia to enhance its cooperation with one of 
them, as the cooperation schemes proposed by the EU (FTA) and Russia (customs 
union) are incompatible.77   
Finally, three points can be mentioned to synthesise the above-outlined 
reflections. First, offers of cooperation under the ENP framework do not measure up 
to the promise of future membership. From Ukraine’s perspective, cooperation with 
the EU established through the  Association Agreement  and DCFTA significantly 
enhances mutual integration on the SEM. Yet, it fails to provide access to a full range 
of rights and obligations granted to EU members.  
Second, the non-existence of a clear and distinct strategy of the EU towards 
Ukraine does not reduce the attractiveness of access to the SEM. The size of the SEM 
remains appealing particularly in the long run, which is why Ukraine has committed 
itself to approximate the EU-type quality infrastructure. In spite of certain current 
developments (see above), the Association Agreement and the DCFTA show that 
both the EU and Ukraine remain committed to their cooperation.78  
Last but not least, it is noteworthy to emphasise the power of the  EU’s 
regulatory expertise, coherence and sanctioning authority to incentivise reform 
measures undertaken by Ukraine. The EU has exerted its MPE within boundaries 
provided by the fact that no promise of future membership was granted to Ukraine, 
while the latter has repeatedly declared EU membership as its ultimate foreign policy 
goal. The Association Agreement, the DCFTA and the potential ACAA will enable at 
least the free movement of Ukrainian industrial products. Empirical evidence shows 
that the EU’s regulatory expertise, coupled with the size of the SEM is viewed as a 
source of potentially large benefits for Ukraine, thus making it committed to the 
process of approximation.79 
Nevertheless, Ukraine’s approximation of EU technical standards is no straight-
forward agenda without any obstacles and as such is more of a long-term 
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engagement.80  Thus, the next  section attempts to outline four possibly feasible 
scenarios of further cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. 
The  first  option  is that Ukraine will continue cultivating its cooperation and 
economic approximation with both the EU and Russia. Several experts suggest, 
however, that this model may not be viable on a long-term basis.81 The integration 
projects launched by the EU and Russia are by definition incompatible and require 
Ukraine to make a clear choice. If Ukraine accepted the Russian proposal to join a 
customs union-based SES, it would need to adopt a Common External Tariff and thus 
place economic cooperation with the EU at risk.  
Second, another group of scholars asserts that Ukraine may not be necessarily 
forced to make an unambiguous choice between the EU and Russia.82  The key 
condition here is the  evolution of the ENP in the direction of  at least minimal 
institutionalisation. Pardo proposes the concept of an Advanced Partnership, which 
builds on the concept of the  ENP and allows for sufficient flexibility of individual 
countries to follow the cooperation according to their political situation, ambitions 
and developments.83 The unique feature of this model is its ambition to integrate the 
ENP countries more closely with the EU but keep them below the status of full-fledged 
members. Hence, employing Pardo’s proposal would enable both the  EU and 
Ukraine to develop their relations under more flexible terms than a proper member-
ship would require, thereby allowing Ukraine to pursue its current cooperation with 
Russia.  
Third, Ukraine may continue considering approximation and deeper 
economic  integration with the EU in the context of its repeatedly reaffirmed 
membership aspirations. Under this scenario it is essential that the EU-Ukraine relations 
are further addressed in the context of the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle. This option thus 
presumes that the EU would play a more active role in the trialogue with Ukraine and 
Russia, in order to provide for a more favourable recognition of all actors and their 
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interests in play,  paying special attention to EU-Russian relations and Ukrainian-
Russian interdependence.84 
Finally, Ukraine may truly embark on its EU path by intensifying the cooperation 
and approximation with the  acquis  as foreseen under the  ENP and the  EaP. 
Consequently, Ukraine might lose in certain areas of traditional cooperation with 
Russia, such as energy procurement and distribution. This scenario may have two 
possible vectors. First, Ukraine’s obligation to make a definitive foreign policy choice 
may actually magnify its leverage towards the EU. Second, if the EU refrained from 
providing a credible membership promise, it may in turn promote enhancement of 
the ENP and the EaP by striving for more intra- and inter-regional cooperation. Thus, 
under this scenario, Ukraine’s economy is predicted to benefit from making a pro-EU 
choice even if the EU will not reciprocate with a membership promise. 
These scenarios are considered as more or less plausible and likely to emerge 
in future discussions on Ukraine’s approximation to the EU’s standards and 
regulations.  Even though the EU-Ukrainian relations were deliberated also in the 
context of the  EU-Ukrainian-Russian triangle, the scenario  of Ukraine opting for 
deeper cooperation with Russia may not be viable and  is not discussed in more 
detailed due to the following reasons. First, the main deliberation concentrated on 
the framework of the ENP, EaP and the EU-Ukrainian relations. Second, Ukraine has 
intentionally opted out and/or followed merely various forms of sectoral cooperation 
under  the  CIS cooperation frameworks proposed by Russia, due to its balanced 
approach between the West and the East. Third, based on the historically-inherent 
political, economic, social and demographical conditions in Ukraine, a clear-cut pro-
Russian choice does not seem viable due to domestic contentions. And finally, in the 
short and medium term Ukraine is unlikely to substantially change its approach.  
Thus, I conclude that the proposed options provide a valid assessment of the 
future EU-Ukrainian relations. Continued approximation of technical standards under 
the third scenario is viewed as substantially beneficial for Ukraine as it would align its 
quality infrastructure with that of the EU without impeding the EU’s absorption 
capacity. However, certain practitioners reiterate that this  process would take a 
substantial amount of time on the Ukrainian side, yet they also concede that 
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Ukrainian membership aspirations may not be unattainable in the long run.85  The 
remaining three scenarios may not be acceptable to Ukraine on a long-term basis as 
they do not fit with Ukraine’s energy interdependence on Russia nor with Ukraine’s EU 
membership aspirations, albeit rhetorical ones.  
 
Conclusion: Ukraine between the EU and Russia 
Drawing on an intense discourse on the power of the ‘European dream’ to 
drive reforms in European non-member states, this paper attempted to deliberate 
the extent to which the non-promise of future membership precludes or incentivises 
third countries’ endeavour to adopt EU rules pertaining to SEM access. More 
concretely, the approximation of quality infrastructure was analysed as an illustrative 
and important example of such reforms. Given the historical, geographical and 
cultural affinity of Slovakia and Ukraine,  these countries were selected as 
representative  cases  of reform processes conducted by accession countries as 
opposed to those without the ‘golden carrot’ membership promise. Some features, 
such as the driving forces behind political and economic reforms, the motivation to 
harmonise EU rules and  the  cooperation process may be applicable to other 
candidate countries and ENP/EaP countries respectively.  However  the  reasons 
behind their endeavours may deviate to a varying extent. Thus, it may prove difficult 
to generalise also due to the fact that even the main instruments of the enhanced 
cooperation under the ENP  –  Association Agreement and DCFTA –  are prone to 
individual conditions of various EU counterparts. 
Damro’s concept of MPE provided a stepping stone for the empirical scrutiny 
of the two cases. On the one hand, the Slovak case was an exemplar accession 
process, which was driven mainly by a clear membership promise. On the other 
hand, the Ukrainian approximation as an example of ENP cooperation was 
scrutinised to identify the Ukrainian motivations for enhanced cooperation with the 
EU in the field of quality infrastructure as part of the broader relational triangle EU-
Ukraine-Russia. Bringing together the theoretical umbrella and empirical evidence, 
the paper identified lessons learned from the past reforms of quality infrastructures. 
Four scenarios of possible future developments were projected to outline alternative 
paths in which EU-Ukraine relations may evolve. 
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It has been argued that economic motivation in terms of access to the SEM 
provides sufficient stimuli for Ukraine as an ENP country to approximate to EU rules. 
This was clear from Ukraine’s acceptance of ‘self-imposed’ conditionality as some 
kind of ‘pre-accession’ lenses. Furthermore, continuous deepening of EU-Ukrainian 
relations (through the Association Agreement, the DCFTA and potentially the ACAA) 
proves Ukraine’s motivation to approximate to EU rules even if unaccompanied by a 
clear membership promise.  
Despite the benefits that the EU-Ukraine cooperation brings about for 
Ukraine’s economy, the approximation process is by no means anything close to 
resembling a straightforward commitment. Attention needs to be paid to Ukraine’s 
contentious relations with Russia, which have a pronounced impact on 
developments within the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle. Overall, the findings of this paper 
support the idea that for the time being, it is beneficial for Ukraine to intentionally 
continue pursuing a balanced dual cooperation with both the EU and Russia. In view 
of future developments, there remain several issues to be closely scrutinised, such as 
the developments on the Ukrainian domestic scene, the determination of the EU 
elites to extend incentives stemming from ENP engagement, the EU’s willingness to 
address its relations with Ukraine and Russia in a trialogue as well as Russia’s 
preparedness to shift the nature of its relations with Ukraine. More research and 
empirical analysis is needed to determine whether the scenario of a continuous dual 
cooperation with both the EU and Russia is feasible in the long run. 
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